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ABSTRACT
The question of why firms allocate costs for internal reporting has
been brought to the forefront of accounting research. This cost
allocation literature focuses on finding settings in which cost
allocations arise as a part of optimal contracting, under conditions of
asymmetric information and divergence of preferences. This paper
presents a setting in which cost allocations are part of the optimal
contract between the government and a firm supplying goods to the
government. We provide conditions under which an incentive contract
(based on fully allocated costs) dominates a fixed- fee contract (in which
no allocation takes place) in the context of a bidding model for
government procurement. Thus, we provide an economic rationale for cost
allocation.

I . INTRODUCTION
The question of why firms allocate costs for internal reporting has
been brought to the forefront of accounting research by Zimmerman [1979],
and has been further addressed by Demski [1981], Magee [1988], and Cohen
and Loeb [forthcoming 1988], among others. This cost allocation
literature focuses on finding settings in which cost allocations arise as
part of optimal contracting, under conditions of asymmetric information
and divergence of preferences within a firm. The purpose of this paper
is to present a setting in which cost allocations are part of the optimal
contract between the government and a firm supplying goods to the
government.
The necessity of determining actual full costs for the purpose of
contracting between firms or between the government and a firm is often
given as a primary reason for allocating indirect costs [e.g., Horngren
and Foster, 1987, pp. 411-412]. Moriarity [1981, pp. 8-9] points out
that while text books often give this justification, no rationale is
provided for why such contracts are optimal in the first place. We
provide conditions under which an incentive contract (based on fully
allocated costs) dominates a fixed-fee contract (in which no allocation
takes place) in the context of a bidding model for government
procurement. Thus, we provide an economic rationale for cost allocation.
Government procurement policy has large efficiency and
distributional effects on the allocation of the nation's resources.
Procurement policy has, therefore, drawn the attention of academicians in
accounting [Wright and Bedingfield, 1985; Greer and Liao, 1987] and
economics [Cummins 1977; Laffont and Tirole 1987; McAfee and McMillan
1986, 1987]
.
Four common forms of contracts used by the government are the cost-
plus contract, the fixed-price contract, the cost-plus incentive contract
and the fixed-price incentive contract. With a cost-plus contract the
government agrees to pay the contractor full costs plus a fixed fee (or
fixed percentage of actual costs) . Using a fixed-price contract the
supplier agrees to deliver goods for an amount agreed upon before actual
costs are realized. The supplier, therefore, fully absorbs any variance
between actual and estimated costs. A cost-plus incentive contract is
characterized by the government agreeing to pay a fixed fee and to share
in any deviations between actual and estimated costs. Finally, with a
fixed-price incentive contract the government agrees to a certain price
(full estimated costs plus a fee) and to share in any deviation between
actual and estimated costs with the added stipulation that total payments
are to be capped at some predetermined level. Fixed-price incentive
contract is thus a misnomer; such contracts are just cost-plus incentive
contracts with a ceiling on total payments. Following McAfee and
McMillan [1986, p. 328], hereafter referred to as MM, we assume that the
payment cap is not binding. We thus do not distinguish between a fixed-
price incentive contract and a cost-plus incentive contract, and refer to
both as incentive contracts.
The enforcement of a fixed price contract does not depend on the
government and the supplier agreeing on a method of allocating indirect
costs. However, if the government contract is not the supplier's sole
source of revenue, the problem of allocating indirect costs arises in all
cost-based forms of contracts. We define indirect costs as those costs
that are not separable in the output produced for the government contract
and the output produced for sale in outside markets.
MM have analyzed fixed-price contracts, cost-plus contracts, and
incentive contracts in a principal -agent framework in which indirect
costs are not explicitly modeled. They demonstrate (p. 328) that the
government is always better off with a fixed-price or an incentive
contract rather than a cost-plus contract for the case of two or more
bidders. MM (pp. 328-332) go on to demonstrate that for a finite number
of bidders greater than one, if bidders expect rivals to face different
costs, the government will be strictly better off with an incentive
contract rather than a fixed-price contract. MM show that incentive
contracts help stimulate bidding, and thereby help alleviate the adverse
selection problem associated with finding the lowest cost producer. This
bidding-competition effect of incentive contracts is sufficient to yield
the dominance of incentive contracts over fixed-price contracts , even
when bidders are all risk-neutral, and thus when there is no benefit to
risk-sharing per se. When bidders are risk-neutral the degree of risk
sharing is determined solely by a tradeoff between the benefits of
stimulating competition and the benefits of providing incentives for the
winning bidder to expend effort to subsequently reduce costs. That is,
the cost share is chosen to balance the problems of adverse selection
versus moral hazard.
Cohen and Loeb [1988] use a generalization of the MM model with
risk-neutral bidders to show that incentive contracts requiring an
allocation of indirect costs may result in the dominance of fixed-price
contracts over incentive contracts. This result is due to the fact that
cost allocations may result in an inefficient cross subsidization of
products. The fact that cost allocations may pervert the desirable
properties of incentive contracts may not come as a surprise, given the
well-known arbitrary nature of cost allocations [Thomas, 1969, 1974]. In
this paper we use the same generalized model to show conditions under
which incentive contracts dominate fixed-price contracts even when the
presence of indirect costs are explicitly recognized. That is, we show
conditions under which there is a demand for cost allocation.
In the next section, we introduce the problem of indirect costs by
examining the special case where there is only one possible supplier, so
that bidding does not take place. We show that because of indirect costs
the government cannot obtain an efficient (first-best) solution, even if
the government could perfectly audit costs ex post. Section III
contains our model for the case where there are many possible suppliers
and bidding takes place. In Section IV, we present conditions under
which a fixed price contract dominates an incentive contract, and give a
proof of our result. We conclude with a brief summary in Section V.
II. SOLE SOURCING, INDIRECT COSTS, AND AUDITING
Consider the case where the government purchases G units of a
customized product from a single supplier without putting the contract up
for bid. The government contractor is assumed to sell another
physically distinct output, Q, in the private sector. In this section we
assume that no moral hazard problem exists, and that the contractor knows
with certainty the demand for the outside product Q and the costs of
production. If the government shared the contractor's information, the
government should, from society's viewpoint, pay the supplier the
economic (opportunity) cost of producing the G units. We will see that
even if the government could costlessly and perfectly audit ex post
production costs, the government would be unable to measure economic
costs when there are indirect costs.
Suppose the revenue curve for the outside product is given by R(Q)
,
where R( ) is continuously twice differentiable , weakly concave, and
R' (0) > 0. Let CT (Q,G) be the firm's total cost of producing both the
government and private outputs. The cost curve C-p(Q,G) represents total
production costs (including opportunity cost of capital) , and is composed
of direct costs with respect to Q, Cq(Q) , direct costs with respect to G,
CG (G), plus indirect costs, Cj(Q,G). Thus:
CT(Q,G) - Cq(Q) + CG (G) + C I (Q,G). (1)
Cq(Q) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex; Cj(Q,G) is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable and nondecreasing in Q. Indirect costs
include purely fixed costs so that Cq(0) = Cq(0) - 0.
Define Q to be quantity to be sold by the firm in the private
A
sector in the absence of the government contract, and define Q(G) to be
the quantity to be sold when the firm receives the government contract.
Thus:
Q*
- argmax R(Q) - CT (Q,0) (2)
and
Q(G) - argmax R(Q) - CT (Q,G). (3)
The supplier's incremental production costs of satisfying the government
contract may be written as 1(G), where:
1(G) = CT (Q(G),G) - CT (Q*,0). (4)
Finally, the supplier's opportunity cost of satisfying the government
contract may be written as 0C(G) , where:
0C(G) - [R(Q*) - CT (Q*,0)] - [R(Q(G)) - CT (Q(G)),G)j
- R(Q*) - R(Q(G)) + 1(G) (5)
If there were no indirect costs, then there would be no divergence
between production costs (as defined above) and opportunity cost. To see
this, note that when CjCQ.G) is identically zero, Q = Q(G) , so that
OC(G) = 1(G)
.
In the absence of indirect costs, if the government could perfectly
audit ex post direct costs Cq(G) , the government could pay the contractor
the opportunity cost of fulfilling the contract and efficiency could be
achieved. This conclusion follows from the fact that OC(G) = 1(G) =
Cq(G) when there are no indirect costs.
When indirect costs are present, it will generally be the case that
even perfect and costless auditing of all ex post costs will not be
sufficient for the government to measure opportunity cost and reach the
(first-best) efficient solution. To see this, note that in general
Q ^ Q(G) , so that for the government to measure opportunity cost, the
government must determine the actual revenue the firm generates from
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outside sales, R(Q(G)), the revenue the firm would have generated from
outside sales in the absence of the government contract, R(Q ), the
production cost that would have obtained in the absence of the government
contract, C^(Q ,0), as well as actual realized production costs,
A
C-p(Q(G) ,G) . Since cost and demand conditions may change from period to
period, it would not be possible for the government to determine
opportunity cost by measuring only realized costs and revenues.
III. MULTIPLE POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS
Suppose there are n > 2 firms that have the capability of producing
the G units of the customized product that the government wants to
purchase. The potential suppliers, the agents, are assumed to be risk-
neutral and are indexed by i=l,2,...,n. As in the previous section, we
suppose that each agent currently produces and sells another product in
the private sector, and let Q be a measure of this output.
Each agent is assumed to face the same direct costs, Cq(Q) and
Cq(G)
,
but to face different indirect costs, Cj^(Q,G). Indirect costs
are parameterized by a productivity parameter, V^ e [V*,V ] . Agent i
knows the value of the parameter V^. The principal (the government) and
all other agents j^i know that Vj represents an independent draw from
the distribution F(V) , with density function f (V) , but they do not know
the value of V-^. We thus follow MM in using an independent-private-
values model [Milgrom and Weber 1982] in which agents differ only with
respect to a single parameter. In addition to the adverse selection
problem of selecting the lowest cost producer, a moral hazard problem
exists once the contract is awarded because each agent can further reduce
indirect costs by supplying unobservable effort, e. The agent's cost of
supplying effort is represented by a twice continuously differentiable
,
strictly increasing, and convex function, h(e) . Agent i's indirect costs
are given by:
Cii(Q.G) - (Vi + W - e)C I (Q,G) + h(e)
,
(6)
where CjCQ.G) has the properties detailed in Section II, and W is a
random cost factor that is common to all agents, with E[W] = 0. Since
the agents are all assumed to be risk-neutral, without loss of generality
we can deal solely with the expected values. For given values of G,Q,
and e, the ith agent's expected costs may written as:
Cq(Q) + CG (G) + (Vi - e)C I (Q,G) + h(e)
.
(7)
The government is assumed to award the contract for a fixed quantity
G of (customized) goods by means of a first-price, sealed-bid auction.
The winning bid is represented by b, and a e [0,1) represents the cost
share ratio. The contract calls for the government to pay the successful
bidder:
P - b + a(C*(Q,G) - b), (8)
JL
where C (Q,G) is the bidder's observable cost of meeting the contract,
defined below. A fixed-price contract is specified by setting a = 0; an
incentive contract is specified by setting a > 0.
For an incentive contract to be enforceable, the government and
bidders must agree on a definition of observable cost. Suppose that the
government can perfectly audit realized (ex post) direct costs, Cq(G)
,
and realized (ex pdst) total indirect costs, (V - e)Ci(Q,G). We further
assume that auditing costs are known to be the same regardless of which
firm wins the contract. Thus, without loss of generality, we may assume
these auditing costs are zero. Given that both the government and the
supplier can measure actual direct and indirect costs, defining
observable costs reduces to defining an indirect cost allocation between
government output and other output. Suppose the bidders and the
government agree to use the cost allocation rule k(Q,G) that assigns a
share of indirect costs to the government contract. Cost allocations are
defined to have the following characteristics:
(i) < k(Q,G) < 1;
and either
(iia) A. k(Q,0) = for all positive Q, and
B. k(0,G) - 1 for all positive G, and
C. k(Q,G) is non- increasing in Q, for all G > 0;
or
(iib) k(Q,G) = K, a constant.
Indirect costs are often allocated on the basis of usage as measured
by physical units, hours of direct labor, dollars of direct labor, or
dollars of direct material. Such cost allocations may be represented by
k(Q,G) - G/(G+Q). Clearly, this alloction is very sensitive to the way
in which output is measured. Thus, the indirect costs to be allocated to
a contract for 100 jet fighter planes depends on whether output is to be
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measured in terms of planes, labor hours, labor dollars, dollars of
direct materials or some other measure.
For a given rule cost allocation rule, k(G,Q), observable costs may
now be expressed as:
C*(Q,G) - CG (G) + k(Q,G)(V - e)C I (Q,G) (9)
Note that h(e) may not be charged to the project, since by definition,
the cost of effort is not observable. Recall from the previous section
that indirect costs will generally cause observable cost to differ from
opportunity cost beacause (i) observable cost does not represent
incremental production cost, and (ii) each bidder would change the output
produced for non- government customers in response to being awarded the
contract. Hence, revenues from sale of the outside good, as well as
production costs of that good, change when a firm is awarded the
contract.
As in the previous section, we let R(Q) represent an agent's revenue
curve from sale of its private sector product, and we assume all agents
face the same revenue curve. We allow for the possibility that all
bidders sell their outside products in a perfectly competitive market.
However, each agent may sell her (his) product in different outside
markets. We assume agents face common revenue functions so that we may
use an independent-private-values model, and, thereby focus on how
indirect costs affect the bidding for the government contracts. In
addition, we assume that R' (Q) > Cq(Q) for all Q; that is, in the absence
of indirect costs the optimal quantity of the private sector output is
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indeterrainant . In this case, the indirect costs have a major impact on
the choices made by the agents.
Before we present an agent's bidding optimization problem, we
introduce some additional notation. Let P (Vj_) be the i th bidder's
profits given that the i th bidder is not successful in securing the
government contract. Then:
P*(Vi) = MAX R(Q) - CQ (Q) - (Vi - e)C I (Q,0) - h(e)
.
(10)
Q,e
With the cost allocation rule k(Q,G) and the incentive share ratio a, the
i th bidder's profits, if successful in winning the contract, are:
PCbi.Vija) - MAX (R(Q) - CQ (Q) - CG (G) - (Vj_ - e)C I (Q,G)
Q,e
+ bi +a[C*(Q,G) - b] - h(e)}.
(11)
Define
P(V i; a) - MAX (R(Q) - CQ (Q) - (1 - a)CG (G)
Q,e
-(1 - ak(Q,G))(V i - e)C I (Q,G) - h(e) }
.
(12)
Denoting the solution to (12) by (Q(V i ,G; a) , e(Vi ,G; a) ) , and using (9) and
(12), we can rewrite (11) as:
P<b if V i; a) - (1 - a)bi + P(V i ,a). (13)
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The economic cost of fulfilling the contract can now be defined as:
C(V i; a) - P*(Vi) - P(V i; a). (14)
Notice that we do not require that C(V^;a) be positive for all V^.
Combining (13) and (14), we can write the incremental profit for the
winning bidder as:
P(b if V i; a) - P*(Vi) = (1 - a)bi - C(V i; a). (15)
Our model reduces to the MM model with risk-neutral bidders for the
case when there are no indirect costs. Then, Cj(Q,G) can be taken as
identically equal to one (or any constant) for any positive G, and
Cl(Q>0) - 0. The expression in (14) can then be easily shown to equal
(1 - a)[V i + CG (G) - e(V i ,G;a)j - h(e(V i ,G; a) ) , where e(-) is the effort
chosen by the agent when the cost parameter is V^, the government wishes
G produced, and the cost share is a. The quantity V^ + Cq(G) is referred
to as the opportunity cost for the ith agent by MM, so that (14) is still
the expected cost of the contract to a bidder gross of the cost of
effort.
The i th agent selects a bid b^ to maximize the probability of
winning times the expression in (15). Since the contract is awarded via
a first-price sealed bid auction, the probability of agent i winning
equals the probability that b^ < bj for all j ^ i. A bid function
B(Vi;a) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, if when
13
b-j - B(V-;;a) for all j f i, then b^ = B(Vj_;a) is the optimal bid for
agent i. Since the b-?'s are all independent draws from the distribution
of V, the probability that agent i is the winning bidder is
[1 - F(B _1 (b)) ]
(
n_1 )
. This function B(-) is the solution to the
following maximization problem, where the subscripts have been deleted:
MAX [1 - F(B- 1 (b))]( n - 1 )[(l - a)b - C(V;a)]
b
(16)
It is straightforward to verify that the bid function B(V;a) satisfies
the first-order differential equation:
s(V)[(l - a)B(V;a) - C(V;a)] + (1 - a)B'(V;a) = (17)
where s(V) = - (n-l)f (V)/(l - F(V)). Let
S(V) ^ s(t)dt
V*
(18)
Then, (1 - a)B(V;a) can be solved for as
(1 - a)B(V;a) - -exp(S(V))
Y
s(t)exp(S(t))C(t;a)dt (19)
We first demonstrate that the contract is awarded to the most
efficient firm, i.e. we show that B(V;a) is increasing in V. From (17),
and the fact that s(V) < for all V, we see that the sign of B'(V;a) is
the same as the net benefit of the contract to the winning bidder
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(equation (15)). First, it is clear that this net benefit must not be
negative in equilibrium. Second, if this net benefit were equal to zero
in equilibrium for some V, the value of equation (16) would then be zero
The bidder's position could then be improved (i.e. the value of the
maximand in (16) could be made strictly positive) by increasing the bid
slightly, which would make the probability of winning smaller, but still
postive and the bidder would then have strictly positive expected
benefit. It thus could not have been the case that the original bid was
an equilibrium bid. Hence, it must be the case that the net benefit of
winning the contract is strictly positive in equilibrium. Thus, we have
B'(V;a) strictly positive and bids increasing in V.
In equilibrium, the observed costs C (•) can be written as a
function of V and the cost share parameter a. For notational
simplicity, we continue to use C (•) and define
C*(V;a) - CG (G) + k(Q(V,G; a) ,G) • (V - e(V,G; a) ) •C I (Q(V,G ; a) , G) . (20)
Now that we have shown that the most efficient (lowest cost) bidder wins
the contract, we can compare fixed price contracts with incentive
contracts. In the following section, we provide sufficient conditions
for the government (principal) to be strictly better off with an
incentive contract which uses a cost allocation than with a fixed-price
contract which avoids cost allocations.
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IV. THE DEMAND FOR COST ALLOCATIONS IN OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
The government wishes to minimize its ex ante expenditures on the
contract. In order to show conditions under which the government is
better off with a contract that calls for an allocation of indirect
costs, we show conditions under which an incentive contract dominates a
fixed-price contract. This will be suffficient to demonstrate the
desirability of a cost allocation based incentive contract, since an
incentive contract based on no cost allocation, i.e., k(Q,G) = 0, is
always dominated by a fixed-price contract (Theorem 1, Cohen and
Loeb,1988). 2
If a firm with cost parameter V e [V*, V ] is the winning bidder,
the government's expenditure will be
(1 - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a). (21)
The ex ante expected expenditure for the government for a given cost
share, a, is the expected value of (21), where the expectation is taken
with respect to the distribution of the minimum of n independent draws
from the distribution of V; for ease of exposition, we denote this
expectation by Ef^j^j y[ ] .
We wish to show conditions under which the expected expenditure is
minimized at a positive cost share, a . Suppose expression (21) is
A
decreasing in a at a - 0, for all V. Then there exists an a > such
that
EMIN VKI - a) B(V;a) + aC*(V;a)] < EMIN V [B(V;0)], (22)
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which means that a - cannot be ex ante optimal. Therefore, to show the
demand for cost allocations, it is sufficient to show conditions under
which the derivative of expression (21) with respect to a is negative at
a - 0.
Letting single primes and double primes denote first and second
derivatives with respect to Q, we can now state our major result.
THEOREM: If (i) R"(Q) - Cq(Q) < for all Q, and
(ii) [k(Q,G)C;[(Q,G)]/ci(Q,G) is decreasing in Q ,
then incentive contracts dominate fixed-price contracts.
Proof:
To demonstrate our result, we show that the derivative of the
government's total expenditure is negative for all V at a = . Using
(19), the definition of (1 - a)B(V;a), it is simple to verify that:
d[(l - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a)]
exp(S(V))
da
rV* dC(t;a) dC*(t;a)
s(t)exp(S(t)) dt + C*(V;a) + a . (23)
V da da
From the definitions of C(t;a) and C*(t;a), we have the fact that
dC(t;a)
C*(t;a). (24)
da
17
Substituting into the integral on the right hand side of (23) , and
integrating by parts, we get
exp(S(V))
\T dC(t;a)
s(t)exp(S(T)) dt
V da
exp(S(V))
V
1
V
s(t)exp(S(T))C*(t;a)dt = (25)
C*(V;a)
V~ dC*(t;a)
exp(S(T)) dt
V dt
Substituting the final expression in (25) for the first expression on
the right-hand-side of (23) gives us:
d[(l - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a)]
da
rV* dC*(t;a) dC*(V;a)
exp(S(t)) dt + a .(26)
V dt da
For the right-hand-side of (26) negative at a = 0, it is sufficient that
dC*(V;0)
dV
> for all V,
Differentiating C*(V;0) with respect to V, we get
(27)
dC*(V;0) dQ de
(V - e)[k'CI + kci] + (1 - — )kC x
dV dV dV
(28)
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When a = 0, the first order conditions for the winning agent's
maximization problem are:
R' - Cq - (V - e)ci -
and (29)
Cj - h' = 0.
Using the second order conditions, and Cramer's rule we can solve for
dQ/dV and de/dV. Denoting the Hessian matrix by H, we have:
dQ -h"
f
de - (C^) 2
__ = Cj and — = . (30)
dV |H| dv |H|
Substituting (30) and the definition of |H| into the right-hand side
of (28), and collecting terms, we get
dC*(V;0)
-h"
= [ci(V - e)(k'C x + kci) +
dV | Ft
|
kC!(R" - Cq - (V - e)Ci)]. (31)
Since |H| > from the second order conditions, and R is concave and Cq
is convex by assumption, a sufficient condition for the right-hand side
of (31) positive is
C^k'Cj + kC^ - kCjCj < for all Q. (32)
Q.E.D.
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We now present an example that meets conditions of the Theorem,
thus, demonstrating that the Theorem does not hold vacuously. Let:
(1) R(Q) = pQ,
(2) Cq(Q) = vQ, where p and v are constants such that p > v > 0,
(3) k(Q,G) - G/(Q+G) , and
(4) Cj(Q,G) - (Q+G) 2 + F, where F is a positive constant.
It is straight -forward to verify that this example does indeed satisfy
the sufficient conditions given in the Theorem. Note that in order for
the conditions to be satisfied, it is necessary for there to be some
purely fixed costs, i.e., F > 0.
If we restrict the cost allocation rule to be of the familiar form
k = G/(G+Cl) » we can gain further insight into the nature of the indirect
costs that will yield a positive demand for the cost allocation.
Consider the following:
COROLLARY: Suppose that R(Q) and Cq(Q) satisfy condition (i) of the
Theorem, and suppose k - G/(Q+G) . If Cj(Q,G) is weakly convex in Q, then
having average indirect costs being greater than marginal indirect costs
is a sufficiect condition for incentive contracts to dominatate fixed
price contracts.
Proof:
We will show that condition (ii) of the Theorem will hold. For
notational ease, we will suppress the arguments of the Cj function for
this proof.
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Suppose average indirect costs are greater than marginal indirect
costs (hereafter referred to as AC > MC) , then:
Cj < Cj/CQ+G)
.
(33)
Since Cj > 0, (33) implies:
- [C1 -Ci/(Q+G)] + (Ci)
2 < 0. (34)
By assumption Cj > 0, so that (34) is sufficient for:
[G/(Q+G)]-[-C I -ci/(Q+G) + (C^ 2 - Cj c'{] < 0. (35)
Condition (35) is equivalent to condition (ii) of Theorem.
Q.E.D
Note that the convex function Cj(Q,G) = (Q+G) 2 + F given above
satisfies condition (ii) of the Theorem, but not the AC > MC condition of
the corollary. Thus, the AC > MC condition is not a necessary condition.
An example of a cost curve that meets the corollary's conditions is
Ci(Q.G) - QG + F, for F > G 2 .
A necessary condition for both indirect cost curves QG + F and
(Q+G) 2 + F to satisfy condition (ii) of the Theorem is that the fixed
cost component F is strictly positive. Note, that if indirect costs
consisted only of pure fixed costs, we cannot show that incentive
contracts strictly dominate fixed-price contracts. In fact, if indirect
21
costs consisted only of fixed costs, as one would expect fixed-price
contracts would dominate incentive contracts, and there would be no
demand for cost allocations. (This follows from (35) in the proof of
Theorem 2 of Cohen and Loeb (1988).) This leads us to believe that for
cost allocation incentive contracts to dominate fixed-price contracts,
the indirect cost function should have both a fixed component and a
component that alters the total marginal cost of outside output, Q; i.e.,
there must be both fixed and marginal effects.
22
V. SUMMARY
Two common types of government procurement contracts are fixed-price
contracts and incentive contracts. The enforcement of incentive
contracts depends upon an allocation of indirect costs between government
and non- government work, while it is not necessary to allocate indirect
costs in order to enforce fixed-price contracts. In this paper we have
shown conditions under which incentive contracts dominate fixed-price
contracts. That is, we have shown conditions under which there is a
positive demand for cost allocations.
We have not tried to determine an optimal cost allocation for an
incentive contract. Rather, we have found market and cost enviornments
in which any reasonable cost allocation will be preferred to no
allocation (i.e., an incentive contract is preferred to a fixed-price
contract). Also note, that we have restricted our examination of
contracts to linear incentive contracts, since these are the form of
contracts used in government procurement. Even if one could find a non-
linear incentive contract that is superior to linear incentive contracts,
that would not change our basic result that there exist conditions
whereby cost allocations are useful in contracting.
23
REFERENCES
Coddington, E. A., An Introduction to Ordinary Differential Equations,
Prentice Hall (1961), Englewood Cliffs, N.J..
Cohen, S. I., and Loeb, M.
,
"Improving Performance Through Cost
Allocations," Contemporary Accounting Research, (forthcoming, Vol. 5, No.
1, Fall 1988) .
Cohen, S. I., and Loeb, M. , "On the Optimality of Incentive Contracts in
the Presence of Joint Costs," Working Paper # 1445 (March 1988), Bureau
of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
Cummins, J. M. , "Incentive Contracting for National Defense: A Problem
of Optimal Risk Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 8 (1977), pp.
169-185.
Demski, J., "Cost Allocation Games," in Joint Cost Allocations, ed. S.
Moriarity, University of Oklahoma (1981), Norman, O.K., pp. 142-173.
Greer. W. R. Jr., and Liao , S. S., "Weapon Pricing Models for Defense
Acquisition Policy," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 6
(1987), pp. 271-284.
Horngren, C. T., and Foster, G., Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis,
6th edition, Prentice Hall (1987), Englewood Cliffs, N.J..
Laffont, J. -J. and Tirole, J., "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal
of Political Economy, vol.95 (1987), pp. 921-940.
McAfee, R. P., and J. McMillan, J., "Competition for Agency Contracts,"
Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18 (1987), pp. 296-307
McAfee, R.P., and McMillan, J., "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-
Agent Analysis," Rand Journal of Economics, vol 17, no. 3 (1986), pp.
326-338.
Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J., "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive
Bidding," Econometrica, vol. 50 (1982), pp. 1089-1122.
Moriarity, S., "Some Rationales for Cost Allocations," in Joint Cost
Allocations, ed. S. Moriarity, University of Oklahoma (1981), Norman,
O.K.
, pp. 8-13.
Thomas, A. L. , The Allocation Problem in Financial Accounting, Studies in
Accounting Research No. 3 (American Accounting Association, 1969).
Thomas, A. L.
,
The Allocation Problem: Part Two, Studies in Accounting
Research No. 9 (American Accounting Association, 1974).
24
Wright, H. , and Bedingfield, J., Government Contract Accounting, 2nd
edition, Federal Publications (1985), Washington, D.C..
Zimmerman, J. L. , " The Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations," The
Accounting Review, vol. 54 (July 1979), pp. 504-521.
25
FOOTNOTES
1. Greer and Liao [1987, p. 276] note that: "Due to high startup costs
and low quantity requirements, most major weapon systems are acquired
using sole source contracts."
2. If k(Q,G) - 0, then observed costs will be constant with respect to
V; i.e., C (V;a) will be equal to Cq(G) . It is straightforward to verify
that Theorem 1 of Cohen and Loeb [1988] holds when observed costs are
generalized to be non- increasing instead of decreasing.
3. It is easy to verify that if Cj is weakly concave, average indirect
cost greater than marginal indirect cost will be a necessary condition
for (ii) . Since the Theorem provides sufficient, but not necessary
conditions for incentive contracts to dominate fixed-price contracts,
(33) will not be a necessary condition for incentive contracts to
dominate fixed-price contracts.
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